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Strategic information spillover to be imitated: Incentive to make
use of relative performance evaluation
Young-Ro Yoon 1
Abstract
In this article, we deal with the topic of intentional information spillover using a model in
which both informational- and payoﬀ-externalities are present and the timing of agents actions is
endogenous. In this model, three players, who are heterogeneous in the quality of their information,
compete with one another in a common task. According to the results, the weakly-informed players
may voluntarily relinquish an option to wait, although no cost is imposed for a delay of action.
When acting without a delay, they reveal their information with the hope that others will imitate
them. This type of information spillover is due to their incentive, which is to make use of the
relative performance evaluation structure under which a bad reputation can be shared if others are
also wrong.
JEL classiÞcation: D81; D82
Keywords: Blame sharing; Endogenous timing of actions; Herding; Information spillover; Infor-
mational externalities; Payoﬀ externalities
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"Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed
unconventionally." - John Maynard Keynes.
1 Introduction
Agents in competitive environments are frequently evaluated based on their performance while
fulÞlling their duties, and this evaluation in turn aﬀects their wages and promotions. While the
evaluation of an agents performance is aﬀected by many factors, her relative performance in relation
to other competitors in the market is often the primary factor.2 For example, if an agent is less
successful than her peers, even though she herself was successful, she will be given a less positive
evaluation than her competitors. However, if she alone is successful when compared to her peers,
she will be given a high evaluation. This comparative evaluation aﬀects even those situations in
which the agent is unsuccessful: if other competitors were also not successful, the responsibility
and the blame can be shared, resulting in a less negative evaluation than if she alone had been
unsuccessful. As a result of such an evaluation scheme, when carrying out a given task each agent
must consider not only her own performance, but also the performance of other agents in the
market. That is, a relative performance evaluation results in payoﬀ externalities.
This situation is extremely applicable to agents working in the Þnancial sector, such as analysts
and fund managers. The most important aspect of such jobs is the management of information
to which access is relatively limited. Due to the agents access to such restricted information, the
agents truthfulness in revealing this information is a key concern. Much of the current literature
addresses the question of agents truthfulness, and proposes that the agents have an incentive to
reveal distorted information. As is well known, herding is a good example of the consequences of an
agents dishonesty in revealing information.3 It is derived primarily from the fact that the revealed
information of early movers prevails over and suppresses the late movers private information.
In much of the literature which deals with the topic of herding, it is assumed that the timing
of the agents actions is given exogenously. Additionally, this literature primarily addresses the
situation in which prevailing information, revealed by the exogenously-given ordering of action, is
available when agents make a decision. Hence, herding is a result derived from the strategic behav-
iors exhibited by the subsequent agents in making use of given available information. However, due
to the assumption that the ordering of action is exogenous, an analysis of agents strategic decisions
on the timing of their actions is overlooked, and thus it encounters a limit in fully analyzing the
2Kutsoati and Bernhardt (1999) provide a summary of evidences suggesting that analysts compensation depends
on their relative performance. They state that "For example, the Institutional Investor (II) publishes an annual poll
of analysts ranked by their forecasting record, and in many cases an analysts salary is aﬀected by his rank on the II
poll. (see Stickel (1990, 1992)). In the 1970s, Merrill Lynch hired top-ranked analysts using the II poll as a guide"
(p 1). Also, they state that "Mikhail et al, (1999) Þnds that analysts who are relativey less accurate than their peers
are more likely to lose their jobs, but that absolute forecast accuracy does not aﬀect layoﬀ probabilities" (p 2).
3 In empirical studies, Clement and Tse (2005), De Bondt and Forbes (1999), Gallo, Granger and Jeon (2002),
Lamont (2002), Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000), and Welch (2000) Þnd evidence of herding.
2
situation in which agents compete with one another and act strategically in regard to information.
For example, if an agent knows and is displeased by the fact that others can mimic her actions
 exhibiting herding behaviors  she may try to hide her information from the others. If, on the
other hand, she determines that herding by others is helpful to her for some reasons, she may try
to reveal her information to the others. As an action reveals the information on which it is based,
the other agents who observe her action can thus infer her information. Given these conditions,
controlling the timing of an action is the one way in which an agent can control the ßow of her
information. Thus, allowing the endogenous timing of action gives an agent the opportunity to
make a strategic decision on the ßow of her information through a decision on the timing of action.
The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the forces which yield herd behavior
by allowing endogenous timing of actions. Of particular interest to this study is the role of timing
decisions made by agents who are involved in a competitive environment in which their payoﬀs
depend on a relative performance evaluation. We Þnd that a situation is possible in which the Þrst
mover can have an advantage by being imitated by the second mover. To be more speciÞc, this
article presents the situation in which an agent wants to act as the leader, voluntarily revealing
information for the sake of inducing herding behaviors in the other agents. This interesting result
is based on the agents incentives to make the relative performance evaluation scheme work in their
own interest. While extant literature deals with herding, as it is induced by subsequent agents
strategic imitation, we also, by allowing exogenous timing of action in the model, pay attention to
the generation of the information to which subsequent agents exhibit herding.
The model that we deal with in this article can be described as follows. In this model, three
heterogeneous players  the most-informed one (M), the less-informed one (L) and uninformed one
(U)  make forecasts (actions) about the unknown true state. Two players are partially informed
about the true state, but the third player is uninformed. The signals of the two informed players
are private information. Both informed players observe signals which diﬀer in precision, which is
public information. There are two rounds, but each player can take an action only once. All actions
are irreversible. It is assumed that no cost is imposed for a delay of action. By assuming no penalty
for a delay, we can rule out the possibility that an agent, despite her desire to delay, avoids doing
so because of negative consequences associated with delaying. Therefore, in this model, an agents
strategic decision to act without a delay can be understood as a voluntary decision unconstrained
by considerations other than the usefulness of the delay to her strategy. After all players act, the
true state is revealed and each player earn her payoﬀ following the relative performance evaluation
system. Hence, in addition to the correctness of her own action, how others perform is also a factor
in her payoﬀ. In addition, we assume that, when the timing of the agents actions is sequential,
the follower can observe the leaders action and therefore infer information. Hence, in this model,
informational externalities are present along with payoﬀ externalities. Under these conditions,
each player should decide strategically both whether to act in round 1 or round 2 and how to
act. Throughout this paper, "M" denotes the most-informed player, "L" denotes the less-informed
player and "U" denotes the uninformed player.
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According to results, players endogenous decisions on the timings of actions result in multiple
equilibria in which the leader is never M. Also, for these multiple equilibria, the considerations of
the payoﬀ- and the risk-dominance criteria proposed by Harsanyi & Selten (1988) yield that, in
dominant equilibrium, L uses the cut-oﬀ property according to the relative quality of her information
in deciding the timing of her action. The derived dominant equilibrium can be explained with the
following reasoning.
M, who knows that she is the most-informed player, gives a great deal of weight to the possibility
that her signal reveals the true state correctly. Hence, she regards other players identical actions
as strategic substitutes and delays her action to prevent her information from being revealed to
other less-informed players. On the other hand, whether L delays her action or not depends on
the relative quality of her information. That is, unlike M, she considers acting voluntarily without
a delay even though a waiting option is available. As no cost is imposed for a delay of action,
L expects that M will delay and therefore Ms action would not be observable even if she delays.
To compensate for this loss of an opportunity to infer Ms information, L considers making use
of Us incentive to learn, but not always. If Ls information quality is relatively high, she has a
relatively strong belief in the correctness of her information. Thus, she regards Us identical action
as a strategic substitute and delays her action to prevent her information from being revealed to
U. On the other hand, if the quality of her information is relatively low, L has a weak belief in
the correctness of her information. Then, as L is concerned about being penalized, to minimize a
loss in payoﬀ, she regards Us identical action as a strategic complement and wants to induce Us
identical action through a spillover of information. This is why L acts without a delay even though
a waiting option is available at no cost. Although it is sorted out as the dominated equilibrium, if
Ls information quality is relatively low, there also exists an equilibrium in which U acts in round 1
and L acts in round 2. Furthermore, interestingly, L ignores her own more precise information and
exhibits herding toward Us action although she knows that it delivers no meaningful information.
This equilibrium is also derived by the incentives to minimize a risk by sharing an identical action.
In brief, the results show that how agents make strategic decisions on the timing of their actions
when considering both informational and payoﬀ externalities. As the timing of action is endogenous,
agents can control the ßow of information through a decision about the timing of their actions.
As one way to pursuit her own interest, information can be revealed intentionally if it is of low
quality. The agent who reveals information does so with intent to induce others to imitate her,
minimizing the risk by making use of the relative performance evaluation system. Hence, if herding
is derived, it is toward the action based on the low quality information. In this way, in addition
to the incentives to learn and prevent others learning which are proposed in the literature, this
article provides a new strategic incentive regarding information: to reveal information in order to
induce others to take identical actions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, we introduce the related
literature. In Section 3, we introduces a model. In Section 4, we derive the players best responses
according to the timing of the actions. In Section 5, we characterize the equilibrium of action
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timing. Section 5 contains the concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Gale (1996), and Scharfstein and
Stein (1990) are representative articles which deal with the topic of herding from a theoretical
perspective. The main common assumption of these models is that the timing of agents actions
are given exogenously. Hence, their analyses do not address the impact of agents strategic decisions
regarding the timing of their actions. Also, these models focus primarily on the subsequent agents
strategic decisions in making use of existing prevailing information, and as a result, do not address
the leading agents strategic incentive to reveal information in order to induce subsequent players
to exhibit herding. The "sharing the blame eﬀect," which is crucial in our analysis, is explicitly
mentioned in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and is the one primary factor which yields herding in
their model.4 However, in their model, the "sharing the blame eﬀect" is used by the agent who acts
as the subsequent player for given information. Thus, the point that information can be revealed
in order to make use of the "sharing the blame eﬀect" is not addressed.
Conner and Remelt (1991) and Conner (1995) are also relevant articles in that they explicitly
propose the possibility that a strategic advantage can be attained from being imitated, using Þrms
activities in the market as models. In both articles, allowing others to imitate or copy can be a
dominant strategy if the agents are functioning within a positive network externality. However,
the network externality deÞned in their models is positive in the sense that inducing other Þrms
activities can increase the size of market. Hence, the positive externality deÞned in both models is
quite diﬀerent from the one presented in this model.
Endogenous timing of actions is addressed, in articles such as Chamley and Gale (1994) and
Zhang (1997). Chamley and Gale (1994), using a model in which agents are homogenous, explore
the situation in which an agent intends to delay her action using a waiting option for the sake of
learning. Zhang (1997) extends the model into the case in which agents are heterogeneous, and
shows that the most-informed agent acts as the leader because she has the least to learn compared
to the other, less-informed players and is therefore least patient with the cost of delay. Both models
consider a situation in which only informational externalities are present. Hence, the above results
are based on the assumption that if an agent has any incentive to delay, it is only for the sake of
learning.5
4 In detail, in Scharfstein and Stein (1990), the "sharing the blame eﬀect" is crucially based on the assumption
that smart type agents observe the correlated signal and dumb type agents observe the noisy signal. Hence, when
the subsequent agent exhibits herding, although her actions turn out to be wrong, she can claim that her mistake is
due to the systemetically unpredictable shock. In this model, however, the "sharing the blame eﬀect" is caused by
the fact that in this payoﬀ structure a bad reputation can be shared as more people make the same mistake.
5 If we consider the case in which an agents payoﬀ depends only upon the correctenss of her own action, it
corresponds to the case in which only informational externalities are present. Then, as the agent has no reason to
consider others actions, if she has any intent to delay her action, it must be for the sake of learning from observing
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To my knowledge, Frisell (2003) is the Þrst article to address the topic of endogenous timing
of action in a model incorporating payoﬀ externalities as well. In his model, two heterogeneous
Þrms compete with one another in a common task, and each Þrms type is private information. It
shows that if the payoﬀ externalities are positive, the more-informed agent acts as the Þrst mover
to induce the other agents to take similar actions. As it assumes that each Þrms type is unknown,
this model provides a deeper insight into the analysis of games in which the timing of action is
endogenous. However, in his model, whether the payoﬀ externality is positive or negative is given
exogenously, and therefore the model does not address the question of when the externality can
be either positive or negative and why. In this paper, however, whether the payoﬀ externality is
positive or negative is decided endogenously. Also, this model shows that the equilibrium in which
information is deliberately revealed to induce others learning can be derived even though agents
types are public information. In this way, this article complements the analysis of the case in which
the timing of action is endogenous and payoﬀ externalities are present.
This article is an extension of Yoon (2006) in which, in a similar model, only two types of
players are considered. According to its results, if two types of players  the more-informed one
and the less-informed one  are considered, only two incentives  to learn and to prevent the others
learning  are initiated. Because of the conßict between these incentives, a delay race is induced.
Hence, a cost for a delay of action plays an important role in characterizing equilibrium. Although
both types of agents gain from a delay, the gain achieved deploying a strategic delay in order to
prevent the other from learning is smaller than the gain achieved by learning. Hence, in pure
strategy equilibrium, if the sequential timing of action is derived, the leader is the more-informed
player. The incentive to induce others imitation is captured only in a mixed strategy equilibrium
when the cost of delay is suﬃciently low to allow both agents to have positive net gains from a
delay. Compared to Yoon (2006), this extension shows that the introduction of variety in agents
types can yield a pure strategy equilibrium in which information can be revealed intentionally in
order to induce imitation on the part of the other players. Also, although it is dominated, the
equilibrium in which the least-informed player (uninformed player) can act as the leader and the
more-informed player voluntarily herds toward the less-informed players action is derived.
3 Model
Suppose that there are three players L, M and U, i ∈ {L,M,U}, whose jobs are to provide a forecast
about the unknown true state. The true state is w ∈ {H,L}, which are mutually exclusive. To all
players, it is known that the prior probability of each state is Pr(w = H) = Pr(w = L) = 12 . Before
making a forecast, both L and M have opportunities to observe their own signals θj ∈ Θ = {h, l}
which are correlated with the true state respectively where j ∈ {L,M}. The draws of their signals
others actions in order to make a better (more correct) decision.
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are conditionally independent given the true state and each players signal θj is private information.
The signal θj partially reveals information about true state in the following way
Pr(θj = h|w = H) = Pr(θj = l|w = L) = pj (1)
Pr(θj = h|w = L) = Pr(θj = l|w = H) = 1− pj
where pj ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. From above, pj measures the precision of θj or the quality of information.
As pj approaches 12 , the signal becomes less informative about the true state. As it approaches
1, the signal becomes more informative. Throughout this article, we assume that L and M are
heterogeneous in that pL < pM where the exact values of pL and pM are public information. In
the case of U, it is assumed that she has no chance to observe her own signal correlated with the
true state. Instead, U knows that other two players L and M are informed players and the exact
values of pL and pM are known to her. Throughout this paper, L denotes the less-informed player,
M denotes the most-informed player and U denotes the uninformed player.
Player i0s action set is A = {ai, ti}. First, ai ∈ F = {h, l} denotes player is action of forecasting
about the true state. Hence, ai = h (ai = l) denotes the case in which player i forecasts that w = H
(w = L). Next, each player has two rounds during which she can take an irreversible action only
once and ti ∈ T = {t1, t2} denotes player is timing of action where t1 denotes round 1 and t2
denotes round 2. Although i acts in round 2, we assume that no cost is imposed for a delay of
action. That is, a waiting option is given to all players. If the actions are taken sequentially, the
player who acts in round 2 can observe the action taken in round 1 before taking her own action.
However, if the actions are taken simultaneously, each player has no chance to observe other players
actions.
Each players payoﬀ πi is determined by the following
πi(ai, a−i, n,w) =
(
γ
n if ai = w
−γ
n if ai 6= w
(2)
after two periods are over and the true state is revealed. Here, γ > 0 and it can be interpreted
as the reputation or monetary compensation which depends on the correctness of action. Also,
n ∈ {1, 2, 3} denotes the total number(s) of player(s) who took the same action, including herself.
The important feature of this payoﬀ structure is that
4πi(n, ·)
4n =
(
< 0 if ai = w
> 0 if ai 6= w
(3)
This payoﬀ structure is designed to incorporate the relative performance evaluation induced in the
competitive environment in which players are involved. When her action reveals the true state
correctly, if other players act identically then negative payoﬀ externalities result because the good
reputation the agent earned for taking the correct action must be shared with the others. If, on the
other hand, her action turns out to be wrong in revealing the true state, other players identical
actions cause positive payoﬀ externalities because the blame for taking the wrong action will be
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shared, and therefore the payoﬀ loss caused from failing in revealing the true state will decrease. In
this way, the accuracy of players actions endogenously determines whether other players identical
actions are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. However, as the true state w is not
revealed until all players act, each player does not know for certain whether other players identical
actions will be aﬃrmative or not.
As θj is private information, even if L and M reveal distorted information that does not align
with their observed signals, it cannot be veriÞed. Regarding this, we use the following deÞnitions
throughout this article.
DeÞnition 1 Truthful action: For j ∈ {L,M}, if aj = θj , we say that j0s action is truthful.
DeÞnition 2 Herding: For j ∈ {L,M}, 1) when θj 6= θ−j , if aj = θ−j 6= θj , or 2) when
aU 6= θj , if aj = aU 6= θj , we say that j exhibits herding.
DeÞnition 3 Imitation & Deviation: For U, when aj is observable, if aU = aj ( aU 6= aj),
we say that C imitates (deviates from) player js action.
In addition, if L and M have no chance to observe aU and U should act without observing any
informed players action, we assume that both informed players L and M believe that U decides
whether aU = h or aU = l after ßipping a fair coin.6
Assumption 1
Suppose U has no chance to observe any informed players action. In this case, both informed
players believe that Pr(aU = h) = Pr(aU = l) = 12 .
Consider each players pure strategy.7 All players are informed about pL and pM , sj : Θ −→
T × F and sU : T × F where Θ = {h, l}, T = {t1, t2}, F = {h, l} and j ∈ {L,M}. Note again
that, as θj is private information, it can be interpreted as type. Let λ−j and λU , respectively,
be -j s and Us posterior beliefs regarding j s truthfulness in revealing θj . Then, the strategy
proÞle S = {sL, sM , sU} and λ = {λj , λ−j , λU} constitute a Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium if
Eπi(sL, sM , sU) where i ∈ {L,M,U} is maximized for given λ, the other players strategies, and
moreover if λ is consistent with S in terms of Bayesian updating.
Finally, the timing of our model is as follows:
T1) Nature decides the true state w. The payoﬀ structure and pj where j ∈ {L,M} are
announced.
T2) j ∈ {L,M} observes her private signal θj.
T3) i ∈ {L,M,U} decides both her timing of action and how to act before round 1 starts.
Then, she acts according to her decision after round 1 starts.
6Although U randomizes her action because she has no chance to observe aj , if j can observe aU , j decides her
best response for given aU . Hence, j believes that Pr(aU = h) = Pr(aU = l) = 12 only if she cannot observe aU .
7 In this paper, the mixed strategy equilibrium will not be considered to stick closely to the solution procedure of
risk- and payoﬀ-dominance proposed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
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T4) After two rounds are over, the true state w is revealed. Then, each player earns her payoﬀ
according to the correctness of all players actions.
4 Deriving the best response
In this section, we derive each players best response according to her timing of action. Below, we
provide the brief sketch of procedure and focus on the intuition of the derived result. The detailed
procedures are available in the supplementary materials.
4.1 Best response in round 2
4.1.1 Uninformed player
Assume that tj = t1 and t−j = t2 where j ∈ {L,M}. In words, either L or M, but not both, acted
in round 1. Then, U can observe aj and she should decide whether to imitate or deviate from aj .
As she cannot observe a−j , the posterior belief should be Pr(w, θ−j | θj) and Us best response is
decided by X
w
X
θ−J
Pr(w, θ−j | θj)πU (aU = aj , ·) ≷
X
w
X
θ−j
Pr(w, θ−j | θj)πU (aU 6= aj , ·) (4)
Here, θj denotes the inference of j s signal according to Us belief in the truthfulness of j s action.
As θj is private information, whether aj = θj or not cannot be veriÞed. Hence, Us posterior
belief Pr(w, θ−j | θj) should be based on the inferred θj according to her belief. Next, assume
that tj = t−j = t1. Then, as U has a chance to infer θL and θM , Us posterior belief should be
Pr(w| θL, θM). Also, she faces one of the following two cases: aU = aM and aU 6= aM . If she
observes that aU = aM , Us best response is decided byX
w
h
Pr(w| θL, θM)πU (aU = aL = aM , ·)
i
≷
X
w
h
Pr(w| θL, θM)πU (aU 6= aL = aM , ·)
i
(5)
On the other hand, if she observes that aL 6= aM , Us best response is decided byX
w
h
Pr(w| θL, θM)πU (aU = aL, ·)
i
≷
X
w
h
Pr(w| θL, θM)πU (aU = aM , ·)
i
(6)
Finally, if no informed player acted in round 1, aU can be either h or l. Both aU = h and aU = l
attain the same expected payoﬀ.
4.1.2 Informed players
When j ∈ {L,M} acts in round 2, the following situations are possible: Case 1) t−j = t1, tU = t2,
Case 2) t−j = t2, tU = t1, Case 3) t−j = tU = t1, and Case 4) No action was taken in round 1. If j
has a chance to observe a−j , her posterior belief should be Pr(w| θj , θ−j). But if not, it should be
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Pr(w, θ−j | θj). Also, according to whether U acted in round 1 or not and whether U has a chance
to observe any informed players action or not, js best response is derived from a diﬀerent decision
rule for the following reason. When U did not act in round 1, if U has a chance to observe aj and
therefore infer θj , it is obvious that U will imitate or deviate from aj according to her belief in the
truthfulness of aj , instead of randomizing her action between h and l. Then, j can anticipate Us
best response in this case. However, if U did not act in round 1 and U has no chance to infer any
informed players signal, j expects that Pr (aU = h) = Pr(aU = l) = 12 . Finally, although U has
no chance to observe aj , if U acted prior to j and therefore j can observe aU , j decides her best
response for given aU .
Then, in Case 1) and Case 3), js best response is decided byX
w
h
Pr(w| θj , θ−j)πj (aj = θj , ·)
i
≷
X
w
h
Pr(w| θj , θ−j)πj (aj 6= θ−j , ·)
i
(7)
Next, in Case 2), js best response is decided byX
w
X
θ−j
[Pr(w, θ−j | θj)πj (aj = θj , ·)] ≷
X
w
X
θ−j
[Pr(w, θ−j | θj)πj (aj 6= θj , ·)] (8)
Finally, in Case 4), js best response is decided by
1
2
X
w
X
θ−j
Pr(w, θ−j | θj) [πj (aj = θj , aU = h, ·) + πj (aj = θj , aU = l, ·)] (9)
≷ 1
2
X
w
X
θ−j
Pr(w, θ−j | θj) [πj (aj 6= θj , aU = h, ·) + πj (aj 6= θj , aU = l, ·)]
4.2 Each players best response in round 1
If U acts in round 1, it is obvious that aU can be either h or l because both aU = h and aU = l
attain the same expected payoﬀ. Now consider the best response of the informed player j ∈ {L,M}
when she acts in round 1. If tj = t1, j faces one of the following cases: Case 1) in which t−j = t1
and tU = t1, Case 2) in which t−j = t1 and tU = t2, Case 3) in which t−j = t2 and tU = t1, and
Case 4) in which t−j = t2 and tU = t2. If tj = t1, she has no chance to observe a−j . Hence,
the posterior belief should always be Pr(w, θ−j | θj). Also note that according to whether U has a
chance to observe any informed players action or not, j s best response is derived from a diﬀerent
decision rule. In Case 2) and Case 4), j s best response is derived from (8). On the other hand, in
Case 1) and 3), j s best response is derived from (9).
4.3 Result
From the above procedures, each players best response according to the players timing of their
actions can be derived as follows. The Þrst key feature of the following results is that if j ∈ {L,M}
acts in round 1, she always reveals her signal truthfully. That is, aj delivers j s true signal θj .
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Therefore, if −j or U has a chance to observe aj , θj is inferred perfectly. In other words, the player
assigns zero probability to the possibility that aj 6= θj .
Lemma 1: Player L (The less-informed player)
1) Suppose tL = t1. Then L always reveals her signal truthfully.
2) Suppose tL = t2.
2-1) If tM = t1, regardless of tU , she always takes the same action as M.
2-2) Suppose tM = t2 and tU = t1. If θL = aU , L reveals her signal truthfully. However, when
θL 6= aU , if pM − 7pL+3 > 0, she exhibits herding and if pM − 7pL+3 < 0, she reveals her signal
truthfully.
If L acts in round 2  in other words, if she has a chance to observe Ms action  Ls best
response is always to take the same action as M. As she knows that pM > pL, if θL 6= θM , she
gives more weight to the possibility that w = θM . Hence, she exhibits herding. Interestingly,
when only U acts in round 1, aU can aﬀect As best response in round 2 according to the values
of pL and pM even though L knows that aU delivers no information about the true state. This
is due to the presence of the payoﬀ externality induced by the given payoﬀ structure. Although
Us action does not reveal any meaningful information about the true state, sometimes it can be
matched with Ms action and moreover it can be that aL 6= aM = aU = w. If this happens, L is
penalized by herself and earns the lowest payoﬀ −γ. Therefore, L should be concerned about aU
and she becomes more concerned as her belief in the correctness of her information becomes weaker.
Hence, when her information quality is relatively low (i.e. pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, which means that
pL <
pM+3
7 , if θL 6= aU ), L exhibits herding, ignoring her own meaningful information although it
is correlated with the true state. However, if she has a relatively strong belief in the correctness
of her information (i.e., pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, which means that pL > pM+37 ), although θL 6= aU , she
does not exhibit herding and instead reveals her signal truthfully.
Lemma 2: Player M (The most-informed player)
M reveal her signal truthfully always.
Ms best response, which is always to reveal her information truthfully, is intuitive because she
knows that she is the most-informed player. It should be particularly noted that, unlike L, when
only U acted in round 1, Us action does not aﬀect Ms best response. As M knows that she is
the most-informed player, although she can be concerned about the case in which aM 6= aL = aU ,
she gives more weight to the possibility that aM = w. Hence, M is less concerned about being
penalized by herself. This is why, in contrast to L, she does not exhibit herding.
Lemma 3: Player U (The uninformed player)
1) Suppose tU = t1. Then, U announces either h or l.
2) Suppose tU = t2 where j ∈ {L,M}.
2-1) If tj = t1 and t−j = t2, she imitates that aj.
2-2) If tj = t1 and t−j = t1, she imitates aM regardless of aL.
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2-3) If tj = t−j = t2, U announces either h or l.
The result that U imitates the observed action of any informed player is intuitive because, by
doing so, she can free-ride on the information correlated with the true state. It is also natural for
U to imitate Ms action when she can observe both informed players actions because U knows that
M is more informed than L.
4.4 Expected payoﬀs
Note that, as each players timing of action is decided endogenously, each player should decide her
timing of action before round 1 starts. Hence, in the case of j ∈ {L,M}, the posterior belief should
be about the true state and the other informed players true signal, i.e., Pr (w, θ−j | θj). In the case
of U, as she has no chance to observe any informed players action, her belief should be about the
true state and both informed players true signals, i.e., Pr (w, θ−j , θj). The realization of aj , a−j
and aU in each case depends on each players best response, proposed in Lemma 1,2 and 3.
Now, each players expected payoﬀs according to the players timings of actions are derived in
the following. In the case of j ∈ {L,M}, if (tL, tM , tU ) does not allow U to observe any informed
players action, then j0s expected payoﬀ is derived by
Eπj(tL, tM , tU ) =
1
2
X
w
X
θ−j
Pr(w, θ−j | θj) [πj (·, aU = h) + πj (·, aU = l)] (10)
On the other hand, if (tL, tM , tU ) allows U to observe either aj or a−j or both, j0s expected payoﬀ
is derived by
Eπj(tL, tM , tU ) =
X
w
X
θ−j
[Pr(w, θ−j | θj)πj (aL, aM , aU )] (11)
In the case of U, her expected payoﬀ is derived by
EπU (tL, tM , tU ) =
X
w
X
θ−j
X
θj
Pr(w, θ−j , θj)πj (aL, aM , aU ) (12)
Then, each players expected payoﬀ according to (tL, tM , tU ) can be derived as follows.
1) Player L (less-informed player)
EπL(t1, t1, t1) = EπL(t1, t2, t1) = EπL(t2, t2, t2) =
¡− 112¢ γ (4pM − 14pL + 5)
EπL(t1, t1, t2) =
¡−13¢ γ (2pM − 4pL + 1)
EπL(t1, t2, t2) =
¡−16¢ γ (pM − 5pL + 2)
EπL(t2, t1, t1) =
5
12γ (2pM − 1)
EπL(t2, t1, t2) =
1
3γ (2pM − 1)
EπL(t2, t2, t1) =
( ¡− 112¢ γ (2pM − 1) if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0¡− 112¢ γ (4pM − 14pL + 5) if pM − 7pL + 3 < 0
2) Player M (Most-informed player)
EπM(t1, t1, t1) = EπM(t1, t2, t1) = EπM(t2, t2, t2) =
1
12γ (14pM − 4pL − 5)
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EπM(t1, t1, t2) =
1
6γ (5pM − pL − 2)
EπM(t1, t2, t2) =
1
3γ (4pM − 2pL − 1)
EπM(t2, t1, t1) =
5
12γ (2pM − 1)
EπM(t2, t1, t2) =
1
3γ (2pM − 1)
EπM(t2, t2, t1) =
(
2
3γ (2pM − 1) if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0
1
12γ (14pM − 4pL − 5) if pM − 7pL + 3 < 0
3) Player U (Uninformed player)
EπU (t1, t1, t1) = EπU (t1, t2, t1) = EπU (t2, t2, t2) =
¡−13¢ γ (pL + pM − 1)
EπU (t1, t1, t2) =
1
6γ (5pM − pL − 2)
EπU (t1, t2, t2) =
¡−16¢ γ (pM − 5pL + 2)
EπU (t2, t1, t1) =
¡−13¢ γ (2pM − 1)
EπU (t2, t1, t2) =
1
3γ (2pM − 1)
EπU (t2, t2, t1) =
( ¡− 112¢ γ (2pM − 1) if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0¡−13¢ γ (pL + pM − 1) if pM − 7pL + 3 < 0
5 Equilibrium
5.1 Multiple equilibria
In the following, we consider the pure strategy equilibrium. The computations yield the following
result.
Proposition 1
The pure strategy equilibrium of the timing of action can be characterized as follows.
1) Suppose 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 . Then, there exist multiple equilibria (tL, tM , tU ) = (t1, t2, t2) and
(tL, tM , tU ) = (t2, t2, t1).
2) Suppose 2pM+14 < pL < pM . Then, there exist multiple equilibria (tL, tM , tU ) = (t2, t2, t2) and
(tL, tM , tU ) = (t2, t2, t1).
First, it can be checked that M, using the option to wait, always acts in round 2. Because M
knows she is the most-informed player, she gives more weight to the possibility that her action
reveals the true state correctly. When she forecasts the true state correctly, she regards the other
players identical actions as ones which cause a negative payoﬀ externality, because the good repu-
tation her correct action earned must be further divided as more players take identical actions. If
her information is revealed to any less-informed player, her action will be imitated, which is what
she wants to avoid. Therefore, she always uses a waiting option to prevent revealing her information
to other less-informed players.
Next, Ls decision on the timing of action depends on the values of pM and pL as follows. If
her information quality is relatively low, i.e. 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 , she acts in either round 1 or round
2. On the other hand, if her information quality is relatively high, i.e., 2pM+14 < pL < pM , she
always acts in round 2 using a waiting option. If 2pM+14 < pL < pM , it corresponds to the case in
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which pL is relatively high for given pM . Hence, in this case, L expects that θL has a relatively high
probability of revealing the true state correctly. L knows that when she acts in round 1 and U acts
in round 2, U imitates her action and this prevents the worst case scenario in which L earns the
lowest payoﬀ. In that sense, Us identical action can be aﬃrmative to L. However, when L has a
relatively strong conÞdence in the correctness of her information, she does not intend to induce Us
imitation. That is, L gives more weight to the possibility that Us imitation can cause a negative
payoﬀ externality. Therefore, L wants to prevent her information from being revealed to U, which
is why she delays her action using a waiting option.
On the other hand, if 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 , L evaluates that the quality of her information is
relatively low. Hence, she gives more weight to the possibility that θL fails to reveal the true state
correctly. Then, it is natural that she should be more concerned about the penalty imposed when
her action turns out to be wrong. L knows that if she can induce U to take an action identical to
her own, although her action turns out to be wrong, she can earn at least πL = −γ2 and therefore
prevent the worst case in which she earns the lowest payoﬀ −γ. In this sense, L evaluates Us
imitative action as one which will cause a positive payoﬀ externality. So, she acts in round 1 to
induce U to take the same action. By acting in round 1, she can reveal her information to U, which
induces Us imitation in round 2. This is why L renounces the option to wait even though no cost
is imposed for a delay.
Then, what is the reasoning for the equilibrium in which L acts in round 2 when U acts in
round 1? This equilibrium is supported by Ls best response, which is to take the same action as
U, ignoring her information, when her information quality is relatively low and only U acted in
round 1. As explained previously, if she can share an identical action with someone, she can prevent
earning the lowest payoﬀ. Hence, to compensate for the loss of the opportunity to learn, she takes
the same action as U although she knows that aU delivers no information about the true state.
Finally, consider Us decision on the timing of action. If Ls information quality is relatively
high, i.e., 2pM+14 < pL < pM , both informed players delay their actions. Even when U acts in round
1, for relatively high pL, L always reveals her signal truthfully. Therefore whether U acts in round
1 or round 2, all players earn the same expected payoﬀs. If Ls information quality is relatively
low, i.e., 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 , U can act either in round 1 or round 2. For given (tL, tM) = (t1, t2), it
is obvious that U has no incentive to deviate from tU = t2 to tU = t1 because, by acting in round
2, she can imitate aL which is based on information correlated with the true state. Also, for given
(tL, tM) = (t2, t2), U has no incentive to deviate from tU = t1 to tU = t2. If U acts in round 1, she
can induce Ls identical action, which make her earn at least πU = −γ2 . As acting in round 2 can
yield the possibility that πU = −γ, U has no incentive to act in round 2.
5.2 Risk dominance and Payoﬀ dominance
Now, for the derived multiple equilibria, we consider the payoﬀ- and the risk-dominance criterion
proposed by Harsanyi & Selten (1988). The concept of risk dominance captures the idea that,
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when the multiple equilibria exist, players will measure the risk involved in playing each of these
equilibria and coordinate expectations on the equilibrium which is less risky.
Proposition 2
Suppose 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 . Then, for given tM = t2, (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) payoﬀ-dominates and
risk-dominates (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1).
Proof
We consider the case where 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 . For multiple equilibria, the timing of Ms action
is Þxed as tM = t2 for both equilibria. Hence, for given tM = t2, we can focus only on As and
Cs timings of actions, (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) and (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1). In the following, we use the notion
that for a two-player game, the risk-dominant equilibrium is the one with the largest Nash product,
which means it is the equilibrium for which the product of the losses from deviation is largest.
If we recall Lemma 1, Ls best response when tM = t2 and tU = t1 depends on the condition
pM −7pL+3 ≷ 0. Here, this condition corresponds to pL ≶ pM+37 where pM+37 < 2pM+14 . Therefore,
in the following, we must analyze our case 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 after dividing into
1
2 < pL <
pM+3
7 and
pM+3
7 < pL <
2pM+1
4 .
Suppose that 12 < pL <
pM+3
7 . Then the corresponding payoﬀ matrix can be represented as
follows.
tU = t1 tU = t2
tL = t1 −γ(4pM−14pL+5)12 ,−γ(pL+pM−1)3 −γ(pM−5pL+2)6 ,−γ(pM−5pL+2)6
tL = t2 −γ(2pM−1)12 ,−γ(2pM−1)12 −γ(4pM−14pL+5)12 ,−γ(pL+pM−1)3
Table 1: Payoﬀ matrix when 12 < pL <
pM+3
7
Consider the payoﬀ dominance. From the given payoﬀ matrix, it is veriÞed that
πL (t2, t1)− πL (t1, t2) = πU (t2, t1)− πU (t1, t2) =
µ
− 5
12
¶
γ (2pL − 1) < 0 (13)
So, (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) payoﬀ-dominates (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1). Next, for the risk-dominance, the com-
putation yields that
[πL (t2, t1)− πL (t1, t1)] [πU (t2, t1)− πU (t2, t2)] (14)
− [πL (t1, t2)− πL (t2, t2)] [πU (t1, t2)− πU (t1, t1)]
=
µ
− 5
72
¶
γ2 (2pL − 1) (2pM − 1) < 0
So (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) risk dominates (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1).
Now, suppose that pM+37 < pL <
2pM+1
4 . The corresponding payoﬀ matrix can be represented
as follows.
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tU = t1 tU = t2
tL = t1 −γ(4pM−14pL+5)12 ,−γ(pL+pM−1)3 −γ(pM−5pL+2)6 ,−γ(pM−5pL+2)6
tL = t2 −γ(4pM−14pL+5)12 ,−γ(pL+pM−1)3 −γ(4pM−14pL+5)12 ,−γ(pL+pM−1)3
Table 2: Payoﬀ matrix when pM+37 < pL <
2pM+1
4
First, if we consider the payoﬀ dominance, it is checked that
πL (t2, t1)− πL (t1, t2) =
µ
− 1
12
¶
γ (2pM − 4pL + 1) < 0 (15)
πU (t2, t1)− πU (t1, t2) =
µ
−1
6
¶
γ (7pL + pM − 4) < 0 (16)
because 2pM − 4pL + 1 > 0 under the condition that pL < 2pM+14 . So, (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) payoﬀ-
dominates (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1). Second, for the risk-dominance, the computation yields that
[πL (t2, t1)− πL (t1, t1)] [πU (t2, t1)− πU (t2, t2)] (17)
− [πL (t1, t2)− πL (t2, t2)] [πU (t1, t2)− πU (t1, t1)]
=
µ
− 1
72
¶
(2pM − 4pL + 1) (7pL + pM − 4) γ2 < 0
So (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) risk dominates (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1).
In brief, the consideration of the payoﬀ- and risk-dominance criterion yields that whether L
uses a given waiting option or not depends on her relative information quality. In payoﬀ- and
risk-dominant equilibrium, if pL is relatively low, she regards Us imitative action as a strategic
complement and wants to induce U to take the same action in order to minimize the risk. Therefore,
she acts in round 1 to voluntarily reveal her information although a waiting option is available. On
the other hand, if pL is relatively high, she regards Us same action as a strategic substitute and
therefore uses a waiting option to prevent her information from being revealed to U. Especially
when pL is relatively low, i.e., 12 < pL <
2pM+1
4 , the result that (tL, tU ) = (t1, t2) is a dominant
equilibrium is intuitive. When both U and L intend to minimize a risk by sharing an identical
action, the equilibrium in which (tL, tU ) = (t2, t1) is not likely to be derived because sharing the
action based on information correlated with the true state will be more attractive than sharing
the action which delivers no meaningful information. The considerations of the payoﬀ- and the
risk-dominance criterion sort out this equilibrium as the dominated one.
In addition, when 2pM+14 < pL < pM , Ls and Ms timings of actions are Þxed by tL = t2 and
tM = t2 for both equilibria, and what diﬀers is only Us timing of action. However, note that
2pM+1
4 < pL < pM corresponds to the case in which pM − 7pL+3 > 0. Thus, if tU = t1 and tL = t2,
although θL 6= aU , U reveals her signal truthfully without exhibiting herding. Therefore, whether
Us timing of action is either tU = t1 or tU = t2, all players expected payoﬀs are same. Hence, there
should no payoﬀ dominance between two equilibria. Also, it can be checked that the computation
yields no risk-dominance between two equilibria. However, in both equilibria, there is no diﬀerence
in that θL and θM are revealed truthfully and U randomizes her action.
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5.3 Discussion
In a risk-dominant equilibrium, it is easily veriÞed that as Ms information quality increases, the
probability that L reveals her information to U by acting in round 1 increases because the critical
value of pL, p∗L =
2pM+1
4 , increases as pM increases. As pM increases, because the cost of losing the
opportunity to learn increases, L will have the greater incentive to compensate for it by inducing
U to take an identical action. However, although pM converges to 1, p∗L converges to pL =
3
4 .
That is, although Ms information quality is almost perfectly correlated with the true state, still
L can act in round 2 with a positive probability, not to reveal her information to U. On the other
hand, if pM converges to 12 , p
∗
L converges to
1
2 . That is, as Ms signal is less informative about
the true state, the probability that L will use a waiting option increases and, in an extreme case,
it converges to 1. As the precision of Ms signal decreases, the cost of losing the opportunity of
learning decreases. Hence, it will be less attractive for L to induce Us identical action because it
means that her relative information quality increases.8
The key feature of the derived result is that there exists an equilibrium in which the informa-
tion spillover can be made intentionally for the sake of minimizing a risk, although each players
information quality is public information. When the most-informed players information is not
acquirable, the relatively less-informed player acts strategically to take advantage of the relative
performance evaluation. Here, the network externality is induced by the existence of the payoﬀ
externality along with the informational externality. When the less-informed players information
quality is relatively low, she wants to induce the least-informed players identical action intention-
ally and U also imitates Ls action in order to minimize a payoﬀ loss by sharing a blame (payoﬀ
externality). The least-informed players identical action can be induced because action delivers
information and therefore learning is available (informational externality).
In brief, if a player has a strong conÞdence in her information, she wants to hold it and spillover
does not occur. This corresponds to the behavior of the less-informed player when the quality
of her information is relatively high as well as to the behavior of the most-informed player. On
the contrary, however, if a player has a weak conÞdence in her information, she wants to reveal
it intentionally to create a positive network externality. Therefore, in this situation, the revealed
information is of low quality and if herding is exhibited, it is toward the action based on information
of low quality. That is, the less-informed players strategic decision on the timing of action is based
on the incentive not to pursue meaningful information, but to minimize a risk using the payoﬀ
externality.
This model also shows how the number of players types aﬀect their strategic decisions in
revealing information through a decision on the timing of action. This model can be interpreted as
an extension of Yoon (2006), in which the endogenous action of only two types players is considered.
According to its results, the less-informed player wants to delay her action in order to observe the
8By assumption, as pM decreases, pL also decreases. Hence, pM − pL decreases, which means that the relative
quality of Ms information increases.
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more-informed players action for the sake of learning. On the other hand, the more-informed
player intends to delay her action in order to prevent the less-informed player from inferring her
signal. For these two incentives, the conßict of two diﬀerent types of the second mover advantage
is initiated, which yields both players delay race. If we apply this reasoning to this current model,
it can be conjectured that, if M is not considered in our game, L may evaluate Us action only as
the one which always causes a negative externality because she is more informed than U. Hence, L
will delay her action to prevent her information from being revealed and her incentive to induce Us
identical action will not be derived. In this way, although each players information quality is public
information, this model shows that the variety of types of players can yield the possibility that the
more-informed agent can intend to reveal information to the less-informed agent intentionally in
order to induce herding.9
In addition, in this model, it is assumed that the least-informed player is the uninformed one. If,
however, instead of this assumption we assume that the least-informed player can observe the least-
precise signal correlated with the true state, the main feature of the results will not be changed.
In the above procedures, the key factor which yields the equilibrium is the less-informed players
incentive to make use of the learning incentive of the player who is less informed than she is (the
least-informed or uninformed player). If the least-informed player can observe a signal correlated
with the true state, the less-informed players incentive to share information through a spillover
may increase because the least-informed players signal can reveal the true state correctly. As
the risk of being penalized by herself increases, the critical value of her information quality under
which she reveals her information intentionally may increase, which yields the greater possibility
of intentional information spillover in the hopes of inducing imitation. From the standpoint of the
least-informed players view, although she can observe her own signal correlated with the true state,
she will likely exhibit herding toward the less-informed players action because she knows that it is
based on more precise information.
5.4 Quality of information and ex-ante eﬃciency
According to the given payoﬀ structure, the Þrst best case, in which all three players payoﬀs are
maximized, is the one in which all players take correct actions. But, as the correctness of each
players action cannot be checked ex-ante, instead we check the ex-ante eﬃciency of the derived
equilibrium. In the following, T1 ÂE T2 means that T1 is more eﬃcient than T2 in the sense that
the sum of each players expected payoﬀ is strictly greater in T1 than in T2. Also, T1 ∼E T2 means
that T1 and T2 are equivalent in the sense that the sum of each players expected payoﬀ is equal
both in T1 and in T2.
9 In Yoon (2006), in the mixed strategy equilibrium the more-informed players incentive to act as the leader to
induce the less-informed players identical action is derived. However, as is well known, a mixed strategy equilibrium
in a game of complete information can be interpreted as a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the incomplete
information case. In this model, however, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which information is revealed
intentionally by the more-informed player to induce the others learning.
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Corollary 1
1) Suppose that pM−7pL+3 > 0. Then, (t2, t1, t2) ÂE (t1, t2, t2) ÂE (t2, t1, t1) ∼E (t2, t2, t1) ÂE
(t1, t1, t1) ∼E (t1, t2, t1) ∼E (t2, t2, t2) ÂE (t1, t1, t2).
2) Suppose that pM−7pL+3 < 0. Then, (t2, t1, t2) ÂE (t1, t2, t2) ÂE (t2, t1, t1) ÂE (t1, t1, t1) ∼E
(t1, t2, t1) ∼E (t2, t2, t2) ∼E (t2, t2, t1) ÂE (t1, t1, t2).
Here, (tn, tn, tn) = (tL, tM , tU ) where n ∈ {1, 2}.
As Corollary 1 shows, the Þrst best case is the one in which M acts in round 1 and both L
and U act in round 2. This is intuitive if we note that M is the most-informed player. If the most
precise information is available and the less-informed players can follow it, this ordering of action
will attain the greatest possibility that all players actions will be correct. However, as we checked,
this Þrst best case is not attainable in equilibrium because M always delays her action to prevent
her information from being revealed to other, less-informed players. Although the Þrst best case
cannot be attained, we can still check the eﬃciency of the equilibrium and see the relation between
the quality of information and eﬃciency.
Corollary 2
As Ls quality of information increases, the equilibrium becomes less socially eﬃcient.
Recall Proposition 1. If 12 < pL <
pM+3
7 , the equilibria are (t1, t2, t2) and (t2, t2, t1). (Here, note
that pM+37 <
2pM+1
4 .) Then, from 1), it can be veriÞed that the risk-dominant equilibrium is the
second best and the risk-dominated equilibrium is the third best. Next, if pM+37 < pL <
2pM+1
4 ,
still the equilibria are (t1, t2, t2) and (t2, t2, t1). Then, from 2), the risk-dominant equilibrium is the
second best and the risk-dominated equilibrium is the fourth best. Finally, if 2pM+14 < pL < pM ,
the equilibria are (t2, t2, t2) and (t2, t2, t1). Then, from 2), both equilibria are fourth best. Hence,
to summarize: as pL increases, the derived equilibrium becomes less eﬃcient. If we think about
the following reasoning, this result is intuitive. If the most-precise information is not available, the
next best case will be the one in which the next precise information is available. Hence, L should
act in round 1 and U should have a chance to infer θL. However, as pL increases, L wants to hold
her information without revealing it. Hence, the socially less-eﬃcient outcome is derived as pL
increases.
6 Concluding remarks
In this article, we explore the incentive of information spillover using a model in which agents
compete with each other in a common task and earn a reward or a penalty under a relative
performance evaluation system. In this model, the competition of agents is incorporated into the
payoﬀ structure, so that payoﬀ externalities are present along with an informational externality. It
is assumed that no cost is imposed for a delay of action. Hence, a waiting option is available to all
agents and whether each agent will delay her action or not is decided endogenously. According to
the derived results, there exist multiple equilibria in which the leader is never the most-informed
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player. As the most-informed player regards other less-informed players same actions as strategic
substitutes, she wants to prevent her information from being revealed to other less-informed players.
This is why she uses a waiting option to delay her action. Whether the sequential actions of the
informed players are derived or not depends on the less-informed players strategic decision on
her timing of action. If her information quality is relatively high, she has a strong belief in the
correctness of her information. Thus, she regards the uninformed players imitative action as
a strategic substitute. Therefore, to prevent her information from being revealed to the least-
informed player, she delays her action. On the other hand, if her information quality is relatively
low, she may have a weak belief in the correctness of her information. Hence, she can regard
the uninformed players identical action as a strategic complement and may intend to induce, by
revealing her information, the least-informed player to take an identical action. From this reasoning,
the intentional information spillover driven by a desire to be imitated can be derived.
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7 Supplementary Material
This part is for the proof of Lemma 1, 2 and 3. In following, Þrst we derive each players best
response in round 2. Then, using the backward induction, we derive her best response in round 1.
7.1 Each players best response in round 2
7.1.1 Uninformed player Us best response
Lemma A.1
Suppose that U acts in round 2 when only L acted in round 1. Then Us best response can be
described as follows.
1) Suppose U believes θL = aL and θM = aM . Then, aU = aL.
2) Suppose U believes θL = aL and θM 6= aM . Then, if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, aU 6= aL and if
pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, aU = aL.
3) Suppose U believes θL 6= aL and θM = aM . Then, if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, aU = aL and if
pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, aU 6= aL.
4) Suppose U believes θA 6= aA and θB 6= aB. Then, aC 6= aA.
Proof of Lemma A.1
Without loss of generality, assume that aL = h. In this case, Us best response is derived from
the decision rule (4). a) Assume that U believes that θL = aL and θM = aM . Then, EπU (aU =
aL) =
¡−16¢ γ (pM − 5pL + 2) and EπU (aU 6= aL) = ¡−12¢ γ (3pL + pM − 2). As EπU [aU = aL] −
EπU [aU 6= aL] = 13γ (7pL + pM − 4) > 0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, her best response is to imitate
Ls action. b) Assume that U believes that θL = aL and θM 6= aM . Then, EπU [aU = aL] =
1
6γ (5pL + pM − 3) and EπU [aU 6= aL] = 12γ (pM − 3pL + 1). As EπU (aU = aL) − EπU (aU 6=
aL) =
¡−13¢ γ (pM − 7pL + 3), if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, she deviates from Ls action and if pM −
7pL + 3 < 0, she imitates Ls action. c) Assume that U believes that θL 6= aL and θM = aM .
Then, EπU [aU = aL] =
¡−16¢ γ (5pL + pM − 3) and EπU [aU 6= aL] = ¡−12¢ γ (pM − 3pL + 1) . As
EπU (aU = aL)−EπU (aU 6= aL) = 13γ (pM − 7pL + 3), if pM − 7pL+3 > 0, she imitates Ls action
and if pM −7pL+3 < 0, she deviates from Ls action. d) Assume that U believes that θL 6= aL and
θM 6= aM . Then, EπU [aU = aL] = 16γ (pM − 5pL + 2) and EπU [aU 6= aL] = 12γ (3pL + pM − 2).
As EπU (aU = aL) − EπU(aU 6= aL) =
¡−13¢ γ (7pL + pM − 4) < 0 for all pL, pM ∈ ¡12 , 1¢, she
deviates from Ls action.
Lemma A.2
Suppose that U acts in round 2 when only M acted in round 1. Then, if U believes θM = aM ,
aU = aM and if U believes θM 6= aM , aU 6= aM .
Proof of Lemma A.2
Without loss of generality, assume that aM = h. In this case, Us best response is de-
rived from the decision rule (4). a) Assume that U believes that θL = aL and θM = aM .
Then, EπU [aU = aM ] = 16γ (5pM − pU − 2) and EπU [aU 6= aM ] =
¡−12¢ γ (pL + 3pM − 2) . As
23
EπU [aU = aM ] − EπU [aU 6= aM ] = 13γ (pL + 7pM − 4) > 0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, she imitates
Ms action. b) Assume that U believes that θL = aL and θM 6= aM . Then, EπU [aU = aM ] =¡−16¢ γ (pL + 5pM − 3) andEπU [aU 6= aM ] = 12γ (3pM − pL − 1). AsEπU [aU = aM ]−EπU [aU 6= aM ] =¡−13¢ γ (7pM − pL − 3) < 0 for all pL, pM ∈ ¡12 , 1¢, she deviates from Ms action. c) Assume
that U believes that θL 6= aL and θM = aM . Then, EπU [aU = aM ] = 16γ (pL + 5pM − 3) and
EπU [aU 6= aM ] =
¡−12¢ γ (3pM − pL − 1). AsEπU [aU = aM ]−EπU [aU 6= aM ] = 13γ (7pM − pL − 3) >
0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, she imitates Ms action. d) Assume that U believes that θL 6= aL and θM 6=
aM . Then, EπU [aU = aM ] =
¡−16¢ γ (5pM − pL − 2) and EπU [aU 6= aM ] = 12γ (pL + 3pM − 2). As
EπU [aU = aM ]−EπU [aU 6= aM ] =
¡−13¢ γ (pL + 7pM − 4) < 0 for all pL, pM ∈ ¡12 , 1¢, she deviates
from Ms action. From the above, it is checked that Us belief for the truthfulness of Ls action in
round 2 does not aﬀect Us best response. Her best response only depends on her belief for the
truthfulness of Ms action.
Lemma A.3
Suppose that U acts in round 2 when both L and M acted in round 1. Then, if U believes
θM = aM , aU = aM and if she believes θM 6= aM , aU 6= aM .
Proof of Lemma A.3
First, we consider the case in which aL = aM . In this case, Us best response is derived from
the decision rule (5). Without loss of generality, assume that aL = aM = h. a) Assume that
U believes that θU = aU and θM = aM . Then, EπU (aU = aM = aL) =
(pL+pM−1)γ
3(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0
and EπU (aU 6= aM = aL) = − (pL+pM−1)γ(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0 where 2pLpM − pM − pL + 1 > 0 for all
pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. So, she imitates both players actions. b) Assume that U believes that θL = aL
and θM 6= aM . Then, EπU (aU = aM = aL) = (pM−pL)γ3(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0 and EπU (aU 6= aM = aL) =
− (pM−pL)γ(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0 where 2pLpM − pM − pL < 0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. So she deviates
from both players actions. c) Assume that U believes that θL 6= aL and θM = aM . Then,
EπU (aU = aM = aL) = − (pM−pL)γ3(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0 and EπU (aU 6= aM = aL) =
(pM−pL)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0.
So, she imitates both players actions. d) Assume that U believes that θL 6= aL and θM 6= aM . Then,
EπU (aU = aM = aL) = − (pL+pM−1)γ3(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0 and EπU (aU 6= aM = aL) =
(pL+pM−1)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) >
0. So, she deviates from both players actions.
Second, we consider the case in which aL 6= aM . In this case, Us best response is derived
from the decision rule (6). Without loss of generality, assume that aL = h and aM = l. a) As-
sume that U believes that θL = aL and θM = aM . Then, EπU (aU = aL) =
(pM,−pL)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0
and EπU (aU = aM) = − (pM−pL)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0. So, she imitates Ms action. b) Assume that
U believes that θL = aL and θM 6= aM . Then, EπU (aU = aL) = (pL+pM−1)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0 and
EπU (aU = aM) = − (pL+pM−1)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0. So, she imitates Ls action. c) Assume that U
believes that θL 6= aL and θM = aM . Then, EπU (aU = aL) = − (pL+pM−1)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0 and
EπU (aU = aM) =
(pL+pM−1)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0. So she imitates Ms action. d) Assume that U
believes that θL 6= aL and θM 6= aM . Then, EπU (aU = aL) = − (pM−pL)γ3(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0 and
EπU (aU = aM) =
(pM−pL)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0. So she imitates Ls action.
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From the above, it is checked that Us best response depends only on her belief for the truth-
fulness of Ms action.
7.1.2 Informed player Ls and Ms best response
Player L Lemma A.4
Suppose that L acts in round 2 when only M acted in round 1. Then, Ls best response can be
described as follows.
1) Suppose that L believes that θM = aM . Then if θM = aM , she reveals her signal truthfully
and if θM 6= aM , she exhibits herding.
2) Suppose that L believes that θM 6= aM . Then if θM = aM , she exhibits herding and if
θM 6= aM , she reveals her signal truthfully.
Proof Lemma A.4
In following, recall Lemma A.2 which states Us best response in round 2 when only M acted
in round 1. In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (7).
Case 1) When L believes that a) Ms action is truthful and b) expects that U believes that Ms
action is truthful: 1) Assume that θL = aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pL+pM−1)γ
3(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0 and
EπL [aL 6= θL] = − (pL+pM−1)γ(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0. So, she reveals her signal truthfully. 2) Assume that θL =
l, aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pM−pL)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] = −
(pM−pL)γ
3(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0.
So she exhibits herding.
Case 2) When L believes that a) Ms action is truthful and b) expects that U believes that Ms
action is not truthful: 1) Assume that θL = aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pL+pM−1)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0
and EπL [aL 6= θL] = − (pL+pM−1)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0. So, she reveals her signal truthfully. 2) As-
sume that θL = l, aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pM−pL)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] =
− (pM−pL)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0. So she exhibits herding.
Case 3) When L believes that a) Ms action is not truthful and b) expects that U believes that
Ms action is truthful: 1) Assume that θL = aM , assume θL = aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pM−pL)γ
3(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] = −
(pM−pL)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0. So she exhibits herding. 2)
Assume that θL 6= aM , assume that θL = l, aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = (pL+pM−1)γ(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0
and EπL [aL 6= θL] = − (pL+pM−1)γ3(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0. So, she reveals her signal truthfully.
Case 4) When L believes that a) Ms action is not truthful and b) expects that U believes that
Ms action is not truthful: 1) Assume θL = aM = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pM−pL)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0
and EπL [aL 6= θL] = − (pM−pL)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0. So she deviates from her signal. 2) Assume that
θL = h and aM = l. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pL+pM−1)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] =
− (pL+pM−1)γ2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0. So she reveals her signal truthfully.
Lemma A.5
Suppose that L acts in round 2 and only U acted in round 1. Then Ls best response can be
described as follows.
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1) Suppose that she expects θM = aM in round 2. Then if θL = aU , she reports her signal
truthfully. However, when θL 6= aU , if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, she deviates from her signal and if
pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, she reports her signal truthfully.
2) Suppose that she expects θM 6= aM in round 2. Then, when θL = aU , if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0,
she deviates from her signal and if pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, she reports her signal truthfully. However,
if θL 6= aU , she reports her signal truthfully.
Proof of Lemma A.5
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (8).
Case 1) When L believes that Ms action in round 2 is truthful: First, assume that θL = aU = h.
Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
¡−16¢ γ (pM − 5pL + 2) and EπL [aL 6= θL] = ¡−12¢ γ (3pL + pM − 2) . As
EπL [aL = θL]−EπL [aL 6= θL] = 13γ (7pL + pM − 4) > 0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, she reveals her sig-
nal truthfully. Second, assume that θL = h, aU = l. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
¡−12¢ γ (pM − 3pL + 1)
andEπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡−16¢ γ (5pL + pM − 3) .As EπL [aL = θL]−EπL [aL 6= θL] = ¡−13¢ γ (pM − 7pL + 3).
So if pM−7pL+3 > 0, she exhibits herding and if pM−7pL+3 < 0, she reveals her signal truthfully.
Case 2) When L believes that Ms action is not truthful in round 2: First, assume that θL =
aU = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 16γ (5pL + pM − 3) and EπL [aL 6= θL] = 12γ (pM − 3pL + 1) . As
EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡−13¢ γ (pM − 7pL + 3), if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, she deviates from
her signal and if pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, she reveals her signal truthfully. Second, assume that θL = h,
aU = l. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 12γ (3pL + pM − 2) and EπL [aL 6= θL] = 16γ (pM − 5pL + 2) . As
EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] = 13γ (7pL + pM − 4) > 0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, she reports her
signal truthfully.
Lemma A.6
Suppose that L acts in round 2 and both M and U already acted in round 1. Then Ls best
response is as follows.
1) Suppose that L believes that Ms action in round 1 is truthful. Then if θL = aM , she reveals
her signal truthfully, but if θL 6= aM , she deviates from signal and exhibits herding.
2) Suppose that L believes that Ms action in round 1 is not truthful. Then if θL = aM , she
deviates from her signal and exhibits herding, but if θL 6= aM , she reveals her signal truthfully.
Proof of Lemma A.6
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (7).
Case 1) When L believes that Ms action in round 1 is truthful: First, assume that aM = aU =
θL = h. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pL+pM−1)γ
3(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] = −
(pL+pM−1)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) <
0. So her best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. Second, assume that aM = aU = h and
θL = l. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pM−pL)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] = −
(pM−pL)γ
(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0.
So her best response is to deviate from her signal. Third, assume that aM = θL = h and aU = l.
Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pL+pM−1)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) > 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] = −
(pL+pM−1)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL+1) < 0. So
her best response is to report her signal truthfully. Finally, assume that aM = h and θL = l = aU .
Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
(pM−pL)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL) < 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] = −
(pM−pL)γ
2(2pLpM−pM−pL) > 0. So her
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best response is to deviate from her signal. Therefore, from the above, if aM = θL, she reveals her
signal truthfully and if aM 6= θL, she exhibits herding.
Case 2) When L believes that Ms action in round 1 is not truthful: The detailed procedure is
analogous. So it is skipped.
Lemma A.7
Suppose that L acts in round 2 and no action was taken in round 1. Then Ls best response is
to reveal her signal truthfully.
Proof of Lemma A.7
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (9). First, assume that L
expects that Ms action is truthful in round 2. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 112γ (14pL + 4pM − 9) and
EπL [aL 6= θL] = 112γ (4pM − 14pL + 5). As EπL [aL = θL]−EπL [aL 6= θL] = 76γ (2pL − 1) > 0, Ls
best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. Although L expects that Ms action is not truthful
in round 2, the same result is derived.
Player M The detailed procedure of deriving Ms best response in round 2 is analogous with
that used for Ls case. So it is skipped.
Lemma A.8
Suppose that M acts in round 2. Then her best response is to reveal her signal truthfully always.
7.2 Each players best response in round 1
7.2.1 Player U
In the case of U, as she has no chance to observe any informed players action, her action can be
either h or l. Whether aU = h or aU = l, the same expected payoﬀs are derived.
7.2.2 Player L
Lemma A.9
Suppose that L acts in round 1. Then Ls best response is to reveal her signal truthfully always.
Proof of Lemma A.9
In following, without loss of generality, assume θL = h.
Case 1) When U can observe any informed players action
Case 1-1) When L is the unique leader in round 1
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (8). From Lemma A.8, Ms
best response in round 2 is always to reveal her signal truthfully. Then, from Lemma A.1, Us best
response in round 2 depends only on Us belief for the truthfulness of Ls action.
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a) Assume that L expects that U believes that Ls action is truthful. Then, L expects that U
imitates Ls action always. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
¡−16¢ γ (pM − 5pL + 2) and EπL [aL 6= θL] =¡−16¢ γ (5pL + pM − 3). As EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] = 56γ (2pL − 1) > 0, Ls best response
is to reveal her signal truthfully. b) Assume that L expects that U believes that Ls action is not
truthful. In this case, if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, L expects that Us best response is to imitate Ls
action. Then, from (a), Ls best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. If pM − 7pL + 3 < 0,
L expects that U deviates from Ls action. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
¡−12¢ γ (pM − 3pL + 1) and
EπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡−12¢ γ (3pL + pM − 2). As EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] = 32γ (2pL − 1) > 0,
Ls best response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Case 1-2) Both L and M act in round 1
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (8). From Lemma A.3, Us best
response in round 2 depends on her belief for the truthfulness of Ms action. 1) Assume that both L
believes that Ms action is truthful and expects that U believe that Ms action is truthful. Then, L
expects that U imitates Ms action in round 2. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
¡−13¢ γ (2pM − 4pL + 1) and
EπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡−13¢ γ (4pL + 2pM − 3). As EπL [aL = θL]− EπL [aL 6= θL] = 43γ (2pL − 1) > 0,
Ls best response is to reveal her signal truthfully. 2) Assume that L believes that Ms action
is truthful and expects that U believes that Ms action is not truthful. In this case, L ex-
pects that U deviates from Ms action in round 2. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 12γ (2pL − 1) > 0
and EπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡−12¢ γ (2pL − 1) < 0. So Ls best response is to reveal her signal truth-
fully. 3) Assume that L believes that Ms action is not truthful and expects that U believes
that Ms action is truthful. In this case, L expects that U deviates from Ms action in round
2. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 13γ (4pL + 2pM − 3) and EπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡−13¢ γ (4pL + 2pM − 3). As
EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] = 23 (4pL + 2pM − 3) γ > 0 for all pL, pM ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, Ls best re-
sponse is to reveal her signal truthfully. 4) Assume that L believes that Ms action is not truthful
and expects that U believes that Ms action is not truthful. In this case, L expects that U devi-
ates from Ms action in round 2. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 12γ (2pL − 1) > 0 and EπL [aL 6= θL] =¡−12¢ γ (2pL − 1) < 0. So Ls best response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Case 2) When U has no chance to observe any informed players action.
Case 2-1) When both L and U act in round 1
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (9). From Lemma A.8, both L and
U expect that M acts truthfully in round 2. Then, EπL [aL = θL] =
¡− 112¢ γ (4pM − 14pL + 5) and
EπL [aL 6= θL] =
¡− 112¢ γ (14pL + 4pM − 9). As EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] = 76γ (2pL − 1) >
0, Ls best response is to reveal her signal truthfully.
Case 2-2) When all players act in round 1
In this case, Ls best response is derived from the decision rule (9). First, assume that L be-
lieves that Ms action is truthful. Then, this case corresponds to case 2-1). So Ls best response
is to reveal her signal truthfully. Second, assume that L believes that Ms action is not truth-
ful. Then, EπL [aL = θL] = 112γ (14pL + 4pM − 9) and EπL [aL 6= θL] = 112γ (4pM − 14pL + 5).
As EπL [aL = θL] − EπL [aL 6= θL] = 76γ (2pL − 1) > 0, Ls best response is to reveal her signal
truthfully.
Finally, Ls best response is always to reveal her signal truthfully.
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7.2.3 Player M
Lemma A.10
Suppose M takes action in round 1. Then Ms best response is to reveal her signal truthfully
always.
Proof of Lemma A.10
The proof procedure is analogous to that used for the proof of Lemma A.9. So it is skipped.
7.3 Summary of results
From Lemma A.9 and A.10, if tj = t1, always aj = θj for j ∈ {L,M}. Also, from Lemma A.8,
if tM = t2, always aM = θM . Then, these results simplify our derived each players best response
as follows: 1) In Lemma A.1, if U acts in round 2 when only L acted in round 1, aU = aL. 2) In
Lemma A.2, if U acts in round 2 and only M acted in round 1, aU = aM . 3) In Lemma A.3, if U
acts in round 2 when both L and M acted in round 1, aU = aM . 4) In Lemma A.4, if L acts in
round 2 when only M acted in round 1, if θL = aM , aL = θL and if θL 6= aM , aL = aM 6= θL. 5) In
Lemma A.5, if L acts in round 2 and only U acted in round 1, if θL = aU , aL = θL. However, when
θL 6= aU , if pM − 7pL + 3 > 0, aL = aU 6= θL and if pM − 7pL + 3 < 0, aL = θL. 6) In Lemma A.6,
when L acts in round 2 and both M and U acted in round 1, if θL = aM , aL = θL, but if θL 6= aM ,
aL = aM 6= θL. Then, these are the desired results which are Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3.
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